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By Mark Wilkinson, Ph.D. [ United Nations Mine Action Service Iraq ]
EXTENT. Despite the progress made in removing EH from areas 
liberated from ISIS after 2017,4 Iraq still remains one of the world’s 
most contaminated countries by area5,6,7 based on its more than 2,500 
square kilometers of contaminated land. To place this in perspective, 
the International Campaign to Ban Landmines classifies contamina-
tion in excess of 100 square kilometers as “massive.”8 Add on to this 
estimate the fact that an estimated 130,000 residential homes in liber-
ated areas are reported as damaged or destroyed,9 and many of these 
are assessed as likely to contain explosive remnants of war (ERW) or 
IEDs and the true scale of the problem is immense.10 Further, the over-
all impact of the level of EH contamination across all economic sectors 
has yet to be measured. For example, in Ninewa Governate alone, of 
a total of 100 confirmed and suspected hazardous areas (SHA) iden-
tified in al-Hamdaniya, Baashiqa, and Tilkaif districts, the majority 
of SHAs were located in agricultural areas.11 As of 2019, agricultural 
capacity, the second most important sector of the Iraqi economy after 
oil, remains down 40 percent from pre-ISIS levels.12 
ENVIRONMENT. Within Iraq’s recorded contaminated areas, 
two types of environments bracket the clearance landscape extremes. 
The first concerns the comparatively simple rural environment defined 
by predictability and consistency. These can comprise IEDs of similar 
design laid in linear patterns with even spacing to defend a position 
from an assault, either surface or sub-surface, in open land typically 
visible to the naked eye, easily detected with standard gear, and often 
free from unexploded ordnance (UXO), other battle debris, and scrap 
metal.13 Conversely, the second involves the highly-complex urban 
environment defined by ingenuity and random occurrence. Complex 
environments include a diverse range of IEDs of varied and innovative 
designs, well-concealed with a vertical dimension added, combined 
with high concentrations of UXO, often mixed with debris and within 
collapsed buildings that limit access and maneuverability.14 
EXPOSURE. As with the two types of environments, hazards 
removed and rendered safe in each suggest comparatively low and high 
exposure threat levels for operators based on factors such as device type, 
design, condition, amount, as well as potential biological and chemical 
hazards. In simple environments, variants of a single type of crudely 
but effectively designed, victim-operated IED (VOIED) predominate, 
making clearance repetitive. These VOIEDs consist of a 6-10 kg main 
charge connected by a detonating cord to one or more high-metal pres-
sure plates, and are occasionally fitted with anti-lift devices, a 9-volt 
battery, and a commercially manufactured electrical detonator.15 This 
simple environment reduces the exposure threat to a comparatively 
RE-CONCEPTUALIZING IED CLEARANCE 
PLANNING AND DELIVERY IN IRAQ
THE LETHALITY INDEX:
E
xplosive hazard (EH) clearance comes at a cost and, logically, 
with accountability expected as a quid pro quo both for those 
conducting and those funding clearance activities.1 
Today’s accountability problem arguably begins with the recogni-
tion that EH clearance, particularly in complex environments contam-
inated with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), differs radically from 
conventional mine action operations of the past, introducing various 
new factors that influence costs and cost-effectiveness. This, in turn, 
begs two questions: “What factors?” and “How are they measured?”  
Hence, before the mine action community can evaluate cost- 
effectiveness leading to accountability, it must first re-conceptualize 
clearance itself based on well-documented, current clearance opera-
tions such as derived from the UNMAS experience in Iraq. 
Traditional metrics for the measurement of EH generally utilize the 
relationship between square meters of land cleared and items of EH 
removed/rendered safe in the process, irrespective of other factors. The 
exclusion of these other factors understates both the complexity of the 
clearance problem itself as well as the associated factors that drive costs. 
This article looks at additional factors, suggesting how the sector might 
determine their relative value in the scheme of EH clearance costs. 
FACTORS. Based on experience in Iraq, clearance arguably is a 
function of six factors, each contributing to a cost matrix: (1) events 
leading to contamination; (2) extent of contamination; (3) environ-
ment type; (4) exposure of operators based on device and/or its design; 
(5) experience such as skills and assets appropriate for clearance and 
safe removal of threats as assessed; and, given that ISIS elements con-
tinue to engage in asymmetric attacks on both civilians and security 
forces throughout Iraq’s so-called liberated areas, (6) disruption that 
adds delay to the cost of operations. The common denominator across 
the matrix is the contribution of each factor to time-on-task for those 
clearance assets deployed.
EVENTS. Given that the mix, amount, location, and concentra-
tion of EH in contaminated areas correspond with conflict phases, 
“informed” non-technical surveys (iNTS) as currently conducted 
by UNMAS Iraq effectively “look back in time” to data collected on 
design, manufacture, and deployment of weapons consistent with con-
ventional and non-conventional combat tactics, and documentation of 
hostilities, concluding with the present, on-going insurgency.2,3  With 
this in-depth study of the pre-, event, and post-event phases of con-
flict as a guide, UNMAS Iraq works toward an initial “best estimate” 
of threat environments by preparing for clearance tasks and required 
skill sets and mechanical assets.   
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low level. Conversely, in complex environments, multiple variants of 
sophisticated, time-, victim-, and command-operated IEDs differ not 
only by type of initiation but by their design, components, layout, fab-
rication, charge size, and delivery method, making clearance a bespoke 
task, thereby raising the exposure threat to a high level. 
For example, variants of command-operated IEDs (COIED) can 
include both wire and remote-controlled systems, the latter typically 
integrating modified, low-cost mobile telephones as arming mecha-
nisms, including some with passive infrared (PIR) technology. In one 
instance, a variant included as many as twenty-two 9-volt batteries 
to extend the IED’s “life.”16 Other victim-operated designs use nearly 
invisible fishing twine as a trip wire connected to a syringe or toggle 
switch functioning as triggering devices to close circuits after force is 
applied. These switches often indiscriminately target, but some anec-
dotal evidence suggests a clear intent on the part of ISIS to target explo-
sive ordnance disposal (EOD) and IED disposal (IEDD) personnel 
conducting clearance operations through their placement in the prox-
imity of other, often more obvious, EH. In addition, the threat level in 
complex environments is elevated due to exposure to deceased victims 
wearing suicide belts still buried by the hundreds in urban debris, pos-
ing biologic as well as explosive threats.17
Concentrations of conventional UXO in both environments 
obviously map to the intensity and progression of the fighting and 
tactics used by both sides. Conventional UXO threats include ISIS-
manufactured mortars, rockets, projectiles, and grenades comparable 
in quality to ordnance used by coalition forces. Enhanced UXO threats 
include air-dropped munitions filled with ammonium nitrate-based 
explosives, modified 23 mm high-explosive incendiary projectiles for 
use as hand thrown and drone dropped weapons, and rockets impro-
vised and fitted with chemical warheads sometimes containing low-
grade mustard gas.18
EXPERIENCE. In response to conditions in Iraq, UNMAS 
reconstituted its clearance teams into light and heavy versions. Light, 
nationally staffed teams are small, highly mobile, lightly-equipped, 
self-supported, and specialize in spot tasks, and high-risk search 
and disposal conducted to international and UN IEDD standards, 
capable of deploying anywhere in the country within 24 hours notice 
and remaining on site, self-contained for 48 hours, supported by a 
geographic information system (GIS) and telephone link to off-site 
international staff. Heavy teams are area-focused, traditionally larger, 
usually equipped with mechanical assets but have reduced dependence 
on international staff. This “new business model” focuses on skill 
set development, increased reliance on national staff, and leveraging 
international staff as knowledge “multipliers” to maintain standards 
and reduce costs.19 
ELEMENTS. Given that known or suspected contaminated areas 
are, by definition, inaccessible until cleared, they remain, de facto, 
part of an effective ISIS “de-stabilization” strategy,20 posing a con-
stant threat to disrupt clearance operations, contaminate new areas, 
and to re-contaminate areas already cleared. Recovery delays work to 
ISIS advantage by perpetuating economic hardship, political unrest, 
social strife, and individual anxiety. In one recent, typical month, one 
A Local National Search team clears empty .50 caliber cartridge cases from an area inside the al-Shifa Hospital Complex in West Mosul. This is a ‘Complex 3 Dimensional 
Urban Environment.’ Even simple activities like this require a high level of training and oversight to ensure safe conduct and delivery. 
Image courtesy of UNMAS Iraq.
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of three UNMAS clearance teams deployed had to abort 66 percent of 
missions as a direct consequence of “day of” security reassessments 
or authorities’ denial of access to sites attributable to potential ISIS 
threats in its areas of operations, thereby adding to overall costs.21 
As of early 2020, intelligence agencies see incident trends increasing 
(see Figure 1) in the governorates comprising the “disputed areas.” For 
example, Ninewa and Salah al-Din show slight decreases for the first fif-
teen days of April 2020 when compared with the first quarter monthly 
averages, while other governorates show an increase. As of January 
2020, various intelligence services estimate ISIS strength increasing 
over the past 12 months ranging from a low of 5,00022,23 to 10,000 split 
between field and sleeper cell elements,24 to a high of 18,000,25 highly 
concentrated in the so-called liberated or disputed areas (see Figure 
2 and Figure 3).26 ISIS’s own data from Nada, the ISIS digital weekly 
report, typically trend lower than open-source compilations released 
by intelligence and government agencies;27 clearly, contaminated areas 
work to their advantage as they wage a “war of attrition.” 
MEASUREMENT. Traditional measurement of humani-
tarian mine action (HMA) focuses nearly exclusively on extent 
as a factor (i.e., square meters of land physically cleared), with 
additional metrics such as the amount, location, and concen-
tration of EH removed/rendered safe in the process routinely 
used to supplement report.28 However, this like-for-like com-
parison between contaminated areas fails to account for those 
other factors that contribute to time-on-task: environment 
type, exposure of operators to threats by device type and/or 
its design, skills, and assets appropriate for clearance and safe 
removal of threats as assessed, and security as a function of ISIS 
element activity. How then to evaluate cost-effective, efficient, 
safe, and timely clearance for Iraq’s varying threat conditions 
and complexities?
INDEX. Logically, the more hazardous the EH task, the 
more time required for safe clearance, removal, and disposal of 
hazards. Hence, the need to calculate the relative “hazardous-
ness” or the potential for a task to cause death, serious harm, 
or damage. Calculating this lethality starts with the system-
atic measurement of evidence-based threat data, in this case 
compiled for Iraq’s environmental conditions and technical 
complexity. Variables impinge upon cost-effective, safe, and 
timely EH clearance conducted to IMAS standards. If reli-
able, such data, when analyzed and indexed, can aid decision 
making relating to clearance team composition, structure, 
training, and deployment (i.e., assigning teams appropriately 
trained for each task) with a net gain of increased team effi-
ciency, team member protection, and better value for money 
for the donor. 
DATA. To develop its lethality index,29 UNMAS began 
with clearance data from two IED areas: (1) more than 500 
IED clearance tasks in Fallujah and environs, indicative of a 
simple environment30 and (2) more than 1,000 IED clearance 
tasks in Mosul, indicative of a complex environment, and then 
added both the concept of (3) two-dimensional and three-dimensional 
search; and then, finally, (4) definitions of urban and rural landscapes 
from census methodologies.31 Through this combination and permu-
tation of the various derived environmental and technical factors (see 
Table 2), UNMAS could assign scores consistently for IED locations as 
indicated along with their lethality index scoring. 
UNMAS next evaluated IEDs recovered in Iraq for impact of their 
technical complexities on actual render safe procedures. Scores are 
either evidence-based or assessed depending upon whether the lethal-
ity index is being used as a predictive or descriptive tool.
PHASES. As stated, time-on-task is a function of clearance con-
ditions and these are directly related to lethality. Based on historical 
data for Iraq, the “more lethal” tasks tend to take priority because, in a 
post-event environment, clearance of urban sites (which are followed 
by rural sites) directly leads to stabilization, reconstruction, and devel-
opment.32 While this gives a useful indication of the progression of 
likely task types as time progresses in such post-event environments, 
it does not describe the actual clearance achieved through those tran-
sitioning time periods. 
Figure 1. Number of incidents by governorate according to month.
Figure courtesy of Carol Cleary, based on UNDSS data, 1 January - 15 April 2020, 
 inclusive.
Table 1.
All tables courtesy of the author.
Environmental 
Factor















Cumulative Lethality Index Score 20 * 36 = 720 20 * 36  = 720
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Figure 3. UNMAS Data from IMSMA and SMART System for 2019. 
Figure courtesy of UNMAS Iraq Information Management Unit.
UNMAS analyzed field data for square meters searched as a 
function of time to locate and render safe/remove EH for three 
phases of clearance task types: (1) heavily contaminated sites, 
largely in populated areas and often in support of stabilization 
activities in urban areas prioritized; 
(2) more open and rural areas often 
based on incomplete or inaccurate 
hazard data; and (3) open and rural 
areas based on a more up-to-date 
and accurate hazard database with 
the following observations related 
to impact of time on clearance: 33 
In phase 1, thorough iNTS reports 
had already confirmed the presence 
of EH prior to teams’ deployment to 
task locations. Due to the condition 
of many of these sites, including the 
presence of collapsed buildings and 
rubble, a requirement to use high-
risk search teams meant that areas 
cleared were relatively small, though 
the quantities of EH recovered were 
relatively high. 
In phases 2 and 3, a shift to more 
rural areas saw a rapidly increasing 
area of land cleared with an accompa-
nying decrease in items of EH recov-
ered. This again raises the issue of 
whether area cleared is an indicator 
of efficiency when the data to the con-
trary indicates clearance environment 
and complexity as likely drivers.34
Over time, as the main focus of 
clearance activities transitions from 
complex urban environments to rural 
simple environments and the concen-
tration of contamination decreases, 
larger areas searched yield fewer IEDs 
rendered safe, suggesting a differ-
ent set of parameters influences the 
devices present. This may specifically 
relate to tactical requirements at dif-
ferent stages of hostilities, including 
whether used for offense or defense. 
Particularly notable when used as a 
predictor for the lethality index, data 
compiled shows little-to-no evidence 
of device degradation over time. 
UTILITY. Accepting the evidence 
presented thus far, the lethality index 
arguably has utility both as a 
• Descriptor. Given detailed infor-
mation for a specific clearance 
location (for example through iNTS reports or previous clearance 
activities), the index can generate an evidence-based metric as a 
basis to manage safety and efficiency by ensuring the most appro-
priate assets for the task. 
Figure 2. ISIL Operational Sectors in Iraq.
Figure courtesy of United Nations Joint Analysis Unit, Iraq.
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• Predictor. In the preparation of future 
clearance contracts, or prior to moving 
clearance capabilities to new areas, the 
lethality index can give a metric to guide the 
selection of the most appropriately trained, 
structured, and equipped clearance team 
based on the expected lethality of the task 
location. 
PRACTICALITY. Whether used as a 
descriptor or predictor, the lethality index is 
computed the same way: the environmental 
score is multiplied by the overall total for the 
technical factors resulting in a highest possible 
score of 720 to reflect the most complex com-
binations of environmental and technical fac-
tors, with a lowest score of thirty-five reflecting 
the simplest possible combination of environ-
mental and technical factors. The three follow-
ing examples drawn from completed UNMAS 
IED clearance tasks represent different envi-
ronments and geographical locations, types, 
and quantities of IEDs. A lethality index score 
is given based upon a likely predictive score 
Environmental Factors Description
Designation EH landscapes in Iraq may be characterized as:
Rural – Normally open, flat areas which may or may not be cultivated. 
Normally free of large quantities of waste or foreign objects.  Low 
population density.
Urban – Normally developed areas, featuring high concentrations of 
buildings, infrastructure and support services. Generally cluttered and 
may contain large quantities of waste and/or foreign objects. High 
population density.
Classification EH environments in Iraq may be classified by dimension and technical 
sophistication:
2-Dimensional (2-D) – EH environments requiring clearance across 
surface and depth (sub-surface) planes.
3-Dimensional (3-D) – EH environments requiring clearance across 
surface, depth (sub-surface), and vertical (walls) planes.
Simple – Consistent IED placement, location, pattern, relatively easy 
to detect; IEDs relatively simple in design in relation to render safe 
procedures required. Consequences of accidental initiation during 
render safe procedures are manageable.
Complex – Inconsistent IED placement, location, pattern, relatively 
difficult to detect; IEDs relatively complex in design in relation to 
render safe procedures. Consequences of accidental initiation during 
render safe procedures are significant.
Lethality Index Score A number assigned to denote lethality relative to referent environ-
mental factors, their influence on render safe procedures and associ-
ated risk. Scores range from 0 (no lethality) to 10 (extreme lethality).
Table 2.
An improvised directional main charge in al-Shifa Hospital, West Mosul. Similar items were found daisy chained together with detonating cord and connected to victim-
operated switches. These types of devices with variable and complex emplacements are typical of ‘Complex 3 Dimensional Urban’ environments. 
Image courtesy of UNMAS.
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Environmental Factor Classification Lethality Index Score
Rural: Open uncultivated land 2-D, simple  1, 2 = 2
Rural: Open cultivated land 2-D, simple  1, 2 = 2
Rural: Open with isolated dwellings 2-D, complex 1, 4 = 4
Urban: Open space 2-D, complex 1, 8 = 8
Urban: Village 3-D, complex 2, 8 = 16
Urban: Fringe of town or city 3-D, complex 2, 8 = 16
Urban: Town or City 3-D, complex 2, 10 = 20
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Figure 4. Square meters searched versus items of EH recovered between Jul 18 and Jun 19.
Figure courtesy of Nathan Williams, Operations Planning Officer, UNMAS Iraq.
Technical 
Factor
Description Lethality Index 
Score
Switch Type • Time (not recovered as complete IED)
• Victim Operated (most commonly High Metal  
Content Pressure Plate)







Design Ranges from 
• Simple (single switch, single power source, simple main 
charge) to 
• Intermediate (simple plus anti-handling) to 
• Complex (multiple switches, multiple main charges,  




Distribution IEDs distribution/distributed 
• Facilitates easy identification of components
• As part of a defensive belt




Clutter • Area free of metallic, other contamination 
• Area littered, including with metallic objects
1
2
Access • Location freely and easily accessible to search teams and 
IED Operator. Clearance site simple to mark and access 
control (civilian) is possible
• Location congested, severely constrains search  
planning and direction, access control is not possible.
1
3
Degradation • Clear evidence of aging/weathering of the task location. 
Devices likely in place in excess of 12 months
• No evidence of aging/weathering of the task location. 







• IED location obvious, often visible by eye, easily  
confirmed with detector




Table 4. * The index does not currently consider residential clearance activities.
(see Tables 4–6, predictive scores shown in 
italics, shaded column, far right) prior to 
the task commencing and a descriptive score 
based on the physical evidence gathered dur-
ing that task.
Example One: al-Shifa Hospital, 
West Mosul
Al-Shifa hospital was an ISIS headquar-
ters, weapons store, and weapon manufac-
turing facility in West Mosul. Close to the 
al-Maedan district, the hospital also was the 
scene of some of the most violent fighting 
during the battle to reclaim Mosul. UXO and 
IED contamination was extensive, and device 
complexity varied from simple to complex 
throughout the site.
Example Two: al-Shuhada District, 
Fallujah
ISIS made significant use of IED obstacle 
belts around the city of Fallujah to defend 
against the most likely directional advance 
of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in any attempt 
to retake the city. IEDs were laid in uni-
form patterns in many areas—including 
al-Shuhada—almost always using a stan-
dard device design. Occasional anti-han-
dling devices were located during clearance 
(approximately 10 percent of total devices).
Example Three: Rawa’h, West Anbar
A single suspected IED near a track pre-
viously used by ISF on security patrols was 
successfully rendered safe after an UNMAS 
search team located a suspicious wire. The IED 
operator rendered safe a remote-controlled 
armed PIR switch connected to two direc-
tional main charges. While the device type 
was complex, the environment and other tech-
nical factors proved “less lethal” as reflected in 
the cumulative Lethality Index Score.
Although useful as “stand-alone” metrics, 
as cumulative scores paired with IMAS IEDD 
skill levels (see Table 7), they become a use-
ful tool to assist in assigning appropriately 
trained IEDD operators based upon environ-
mental and technical complexity. 
MULTIPLIER. Given the trend in Iraq 
toward employment of local national clear-
ance capabilities as a cost-saving strategy, the 
index serves as a multiplier by allowing for 
assignment of locally staffed teams appropri-
ate for tasks to work independently with the 
option of technical oversight and referral via 
a telephone thereby (1) leveraging limited 
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international technical advisers on a task basis; and, longer term, (2) 
reducing reliance on international advisors as local team expertise 
develops also on a task basis; and, (3) contributing to an earlier “phas-
ing out” of expensive international heavy clearance teams.
BENEFITS. So what does the lethality index offer EH clearance 
actors? 
First, a clear basis for identifying appropriately trained and equipped 
teams for clearance tasks.
Second, a tool to identify cost savings early in the procurement 
cycle particularly related to clearance teams tailored for requirements 
as opposed to technical proposals often written by commercial com-
panies often based on large EH teams dominated by international 
personnel and a less-than-transparent process sometimes viewed pri-
vately as “less-than-educated guesswork.”
Third, support for the nationalization and development of local 
clearance teams by rationalizing the process of training design, train-
ing delivery, on-the-job training, and continuing professional develop-
ment, linking the transition of search and IEDD activities from taught 
mechanistic drills to more intuitive skills.
CONCLUSION. Although the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) recognize the need for EH clearance as an 
enabler of broader socioeconomic development, funding depends upon 
strong arguments supported by data to respond to legitimate donor 
concerns related to both value for money and return on investment. 
In response to the value for money concern, UNMAS has evaluated 
the IED threat in Iraq focusing on a composite measurement of those 
environmental and technical factors affecting cost-effective, safe, 
timely, optimized clearance done to IMAS standards while consider-
ing each as a variable contributing to overall task lethality as a lead 
factor determining time-on-task and overall efficiency. Although not 
a sine qua non, the lethality index, when coupled with other factors 
such as IMAS IEDD skill levels and related costs, could offer the mine 
action community a useful conceptual basis to continue to refine and 
develop meaningful and metric based tools that are able to respond to 
the fundamental donor question, “How much should clearance cost?” 
for a given environment in a manner more reflective of the true range 
of factors affecting clearance. 
In response to return on investment, the mine action community in 
Iraq still has a need for an economically derived baseline to measure 
“opportunity cost,” or economic and social gains either conveyed or 
deferred as a function of clearance completed versus not completed. 
Arguably, this is the true value of clearance and a separate subject for 
another time. 
See endnotes page 70
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Cumulative Lethality Index Score 2 * 31 = 62 2 * 21 = 42
    Lethality Index Score 
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  Qualification & Experience 
Table 7.
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